Scholarship Repository

University of Minnesota Law School
Articles

Faculty Scholarship

2006

The Absolute Prohibition of Torture and Ill-Treatment
David Weissbrodt
University of Minnesota Law School, weiss001@umn.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/faculty_articles
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
David Weissbrodt, The Absolute Prohibition of Torture and Ill-Treatment, 6 LONG TERM VIEW 22 (2006),
available at https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/faculty_articles/235.

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the University of Minnesota Law School. It has been
accepted for inclusion in the Faculty Scholarship collection by an authorized administrator of the Scholarship
Repository. For more information, please contact lenzx009@umn.edu.

The Absolute Prohibition of Torture and
III-Treatment
By David Weissbrodt I

he President, the Secretary of State,
and other U.S. government officials
have repeatedly assured the world that
the United States does not engage in "torture."
Whenever they try to issue such statements,
the critical listener must ask such questions as
"What do they mean by torture?" Have they so
narrowly defined "torture" as to ask the listener to overlook the mounting evidence of
extremely brutal treatment which U.S. personnel have perpetrated against detainees in
Afghanistan, Guantanamo, Iraq, and other
secret detention facilities? Many detainees
held by the U.S. have been subjected to illtreatment that would, under international definitions and jurisprudence, qualify as torture.
Further, the international prohibition
extends not only to torture, but also to "cruel,
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment." When u.s. officials repeatedly deny
that they are engaging in torture, the critical
listener should be wondering: Are they trying
to ask the listener to overlook the obligation
of the U.S. to prevent and protect against
"cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or
punishment"? When the U.S. ratified the principal treaties forbidding torture and cruel,
inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment, the U.S. interposed an "understanding"
that tried to further define "cruel, inhuman or
degrading treatment or punishment" by refer-
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ring to the U.S. Constitution's fifth, eighth,
and fomieenth amendments. The U.S. initially explained that reservation as necessary to
help clarify the vagueness of the phrase
"cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or
punishment," but high level U.S. officials,
including the Secretary of Defense, have
instructed U.S. personnel in Afghanistan,
Guantanamo, Iraq, and other secret detention
facilities to engage in iII-treatment that is forbidden by both treaties and authoritative interpretations of the U.S. Constitution. The U.S.
also did not attempt to interpose any reservation or restriction on its obligation under the
Civil and Political Covenant: "All persons
deprived of their liberty shall be treated with
humanity and with respect for the inherent
dignity of the human person."
The latest lame defense of U.S. ill-treatment is that the U.S. Constitutlon does not
apply to actions by government officials outside the United States. Not only is this newly
concocted excuse not consistent with the
object and purpose of the treaties that the U.S.
was purporting to rati fy, but treaty obi igations
apply to any person who is within the power
or effective control of the forces of a State
Party acting outside its territory, regardless of
the circumstances in which such power or
effective control was obtained. The U.S. also
did not attempt to interpose any reservation or
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restrictIOn on its obligation under the Civil
and Political Covenant: "All persons deprived
of their liberty shall be treated with humanity
and with respect for the inherent dignity of the
human person."
While visiting Europe on October 7, 2005,
Secretary of State Concloleezza Rice declared
for the first time that the U.S. as "a matter of
policy" "prohibits all its personnel from using
cruel or inhuman techniques in prisoner interrogations, whether inside or outside U.S. borders. "2 Her statement was intended to assuage
concerns expressed by European nations and
to avoid legislation proposed by Senator John
McCain to reaffirm as a matter of legal obligation that U.S. officials at home and abroad
will not engage in "cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment." The Secretary
of State further stated that the U.S. had not
engaged in "torture," but could not make the
same statement about other forms of forbidden ill-treatment.
The objectivc of this article is to set forth
the absolute prohibition in human rights
treaties, the Geneva Conventions, and other
international humanitarian/human rights law
against both torture and cruel, inhuman, or
degrading treatment or punishment, followed
by a discussion abollt how that prohibition
applies to the United States.)

Development of the Prohibition of Torture and
Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment
The first and most visible international pronouncements on this subject occurred in 1948
and 1949-following the close of hostilities
in World War II and the Holocaust. In those
days, the community of nations was trying to
bind the wounds of war and build a new global structure that would prevent another such
catastrophe with about 60 million killed. In
some ways you could say that they were closing the door after the horse had left the paddock. But they also were foresightful in

understanding that safeguards were necessary
to help prevent another world war and protect
human rights.
In 1948 the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights was adopted by the U.N.
General Assembly as the most authoritative
international definition of human rights and as
a contemporaneous interpretation of the treaty
obligations of all U.N. member states to "take
joint and separate action" to promote "universal respect for, and observance of, human
rights .... " Article 3 of the Universal
Declaration proclaims: "No one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or
degrading treatment or punishment."
A year later in J 949, the Third Geneva
Convention on the Protection of Prisoners of
War declared in Article 17 as to international
armed conflicts:
No physical or menta] torture, nor any
other form of coercion, may be inflicted on prisoners 0 f war to secure from
them information of any kind whatever. Prisoners of war who refuse to
answer may not be threatened, insulted or exposed to any unpleasant or
disadvantageous treatment of any
kind. 4
Similarly, the Fourth Geneva Convention
on the Protection of Civilian Persons, also of
1949, in Article 32 as to international armed
conflicts, including periods of militmy occupation, provides:
The High Contracting Parties specifically agree that each of them is prohibited from taking any measure of
such a character as to cause the physical suffering or extermination of protected persons in their hands. This prohibition applies not only to murder,
tOlture, corporal punishment, mutilation and medical or scientific experiments not necessitated by the medical
treatment of a protected person, but
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also to any other measures of bmtality whether applied by civilian or military agents. s
Not only do the Geneva Conventions forbid torture and other ill-treatment in those
terms, but they also declare "torture or inhuman treatment, including biological experiments, wilfully causing great suffering or
serious injury to body or health" to be grave
breaches. 6 Such grave breaches, if committed
during international armed conflicts, are subject to universal criminal jurisdiction as to
which each of the 188 nations that have ratified the Geneva Conventions (including the
United States) are obligated to bring perpetrators, "regardless of their nationality, before its
own courtS."7
The Geneva Conventions of 1949 deal not
only with international armed conflicts
between High Contracting Parties, but also
cover non-international armed con t1icts in
Common Article 3, which states: "Persons
taking no active part in the hostilities, including members of armed forces who have laid
down their arms and those placed hors de
combat by sickness, wounds, detention, or
any other cause, shall in all circumstances be
treated humanely. "8 Common Article 3 prohibits "at any time and in any place whatsoever" celiain acts, such as:
(a) Violence to life and person, in partiClIlar murder of all kinds, mutilation, cruel treatment and torture; ... [and]
(c) Outrages upon personal dignity, in particular, humiliating and degrading treatment....
The next major step in establishing an
international bulwark against torture occurred
when the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights of 1948 was transposed into treaty
obligations by the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights of 1966. 9 Article 7
of the Civil and Political Covenant repeated
precisely Article 3 of the Universal Declaration, but then added one further prohibition

deriving from the trial of the Nazi doctors at
Nuremberg:
No one shall be subjected to torture or
to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. In particular, no
one shall be subjected without his free
consent to medical or scientific experimentation.
The Civil and Political Covenant further
provides that while some rights may be the
subject of derogation cluring a "time of publ ic
emergency which threatens the life of the
nation ancl the existcnce of which is officially
proclaimed," there are certain provisions of
the Covenant that are not subject to derogation at any time by any of the 154 States
Parties, including the United States. One of
those nonclerogable provisions is Article 7 on
torture ancl other ill-treatment.
The Human Rights COI1ll11ittee--thc international body that monitors tbe implementation of the Covenant on Civil and Pol itical
Rights~has provided some guidance on
what treatment constitutes a violation of
Article 7. While not drawing a definite distinction betwecn treatment that amounts to
torture and that which constitutes cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment, the Committee
has determined that beatings; 10 electric
shocks;11 mock executions;'2 forcing prisoners to stand for prolonged periods;13 incommunicado detention; 14 and denial of food,
water, and medical care for an extended period of time 1S violate Article 7 as either torture
and/or cruel, inhumane, or degrading treatment.
The absolute treaty prohibition of torture l6
was reinforced in 1984 by the Convention
against Torture and Other Cruel, [nhuman or
Degrading Treatment or Punishment l7 which
has now been ratified by 139 nations, including the United States. Article I of the
Convention Against Torture defines torture as
any act by which severe pain or suf-
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fering, whether physical or mental, is
intentionally inflicted on a person for
such purposes as obtaining from him
or a third person information or a confession, punishing him for an act he or
a third person has committed or is suspected of having committed, or intimidating or coercing him or a third person, or for any reason based on discrimination of any kind, when such
pain or suffering is inflicted by or at
the instigation of or with the consent
Of acquiescence of a public official or
other person acting in an official
capacity. It does not include pain or
suffering arising only from, inherent
in or incidental to lawful sanctions.
The Convention against Torture not only
calls for States Parties to prevent acts of torture, but it also provides in Article 2(2):
No exceptional circumstances whatsoever, whether a state of war or a threat
of war, internal political instability Of
any other public emergency, may be
invoked as a justification of tortme.
FUlihenTIore, Article 2(3) makes clear that
"An order from a superior officer or a public
authority may not be invoked as ajustification
of torture."
Article 3 of the Torture Convention further
provides that no person shall be expelled,
returned, or extradited "to another State
where there are substantial grounds for
believing that he would be in danger o.lbeing
su~jected to torture. II (Emphasis added.)
Article 4 establishes criminal responsibility
not onZr iCJr "all acts of torture, II but also for
attempls to commit torture and complicity in
torture. Articles 5 to 9 call for criminal jurisdiction over nationals who are alleged to have
committed torture as well as acts of torture
committed in the teITitory of a State party or
against one of its nationals. An alleged perpetrator must either be tried or extradited to a

State that can establish jurisdiction over the
case. States Parties shall afford each other
mutual assistance in investigating and establishing criminal jurisdiction.
The Committee Against Torture-the international body that monitors the implementation of the Convention Against Torture-has
detennined that several methods of interrogation constitute torture as defined by Article I
of the Convention. In its concluding remarks
on the periodic report submitted by Israel in
1997, the Committee decided that the following acts may be considered tOliure, particularly when used in combination: (I) restraining
in very painful conditions, (2) hooding under
special conditions, (3) sounding ofloud music
for prolonged periods, (4) sleep deprivation
for prolonged periods, (5) threats, including
death threats, (6) violent shaking, and (7)
using cold air to chil1. 1R The Committee also
considered these methods to constitute cruel,
inhuman, or degrading treatment.
The European COUli of Human Rights has
offered additional guidance regarding the
meaning of torture and other ill-treatment.
Article 3 of the European Convention on
Human Rights states that "[nJo one shall be
subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment."19 While Article
3 of the European Convention is similar to
Article 7 of the Civil and Political Covenant,
the two provisions are not identical. In Ireland
v. United Kingdom (1978), the Court ruled
that five interrogation methods used by the
United Kingdom in its counter-terrorism
efforts against the IRA violated ArtiCle 3, but
did not constitute torture. The techniques
included protracted standing against the wall
on the tip of one's toes; covering the suspect's
head throughout the detention (except during.
the actual interrogation); exposing the s-uspect
to powerfully loud noise for a prolonged period; the deprivation of sleep; and the deprivation of food and water. The Court attempted to
distinguish torture from inhuman or clegrad-
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ing treatment:
In the Court's view, this distinction
derives principally from a difference
in the intensity of the suffering inflicted. The Court considers in fact that,
whilst there exists on the one hand
violence which is to be condemned
both on moral grounds and also in
most cases under the domestic law of
the Contracting States but which does
not fall within Article 3 (art. 3) of the
Convention, it appears on the other
hand that it was the intention that the
Convention, with its distinction
between 'torture' and 'inhuman or
degrading treatment" should by the
first of these terms attach a special
stigma to deliberate inhuman treatment causing very serious and cruel
suffering. 20
Further, the Court introduced the idea of
"minimum threshold of severity," reasoning
that "ill-treatment, must attain a minimum
level of severity if it is to fall within the scope
of Article 3. The assessment of this minimum
is, in the nature of things, relative; it depends
on all the circumstances of the case, such as
the duration of the treatment, its physical or
mental effects and, in some cases, the sex, age
and state of health of the victim, etc. "21
In Ireland v. u.K., the Court did not, in contrast with the European Commission, consider
the five methods to be torture, the suffering
having not met "sufficient threshold of severity." The Commission had unanimously considered the combined use of the five methods
to amount to torture, on the grounds that (1)
the intensity of the stress caused by techniques creating sensory deprivation "directly
affects the personality physically and mentally"; and (2) "the systematic application of the
techniques for the purpose of inducing a person to give infom1ation shows a clear resemblance to those methods of systematic torture
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which have been kno\\in over the ages ... a
modem system of torture falling into the same
category as those systems applied in previolls
times as a means of obtaining information and
confessions."22 Supporting the Commission's
reasoning in Ireland v. UK., the Court ruled in
I/han v. TIll'key (2000) that in order for an act
to be considered torture, it must be committed
with certain intent:
In addition to the severity of the treatment, there is a purposive element, as
recognised in the United Nations
Convention against Torture and Other
Cruel,
Inhuman
or
Degrading
Treatment or Punishment, which came
into force on 26 June 19X7, which
defines torture in terms 0 r the i ntentional infliction of severe pain or suffering with the aim, intc>r alia, of
obtain ing information, i nJl icti ng punishment or intimidating. 21
Further, in 7j'ra v. United Kingdom (1978),
the Court reinforced "hierarchical" interpretation ofArticle 3, attempting to distinguish acts
of torture £1'om acts of inhumane treatment
and acts of degrading treatment based upon a
threshold of severity: torture presents a higher
degree of seriousness than inhumane treatment, which is more severe than degrading
treatmenU+
In its most significant decision on torture
and ill-treatment since Ire/al/d, the European
Court in SellJlolini v. France (1999), noted
that the Court's view on these issues was
evolving with time so that the kinds of conduct that might have been considered ill-tre,itment in 1987 might eventually be viewed as
torture. The Court ruled that a range of t~\ctors
come into play when establishing \vhether a
victim's pain or suffering is so severe as to
constitute "torture," as distinct from other prohibited ill-treatment. According to 5,'eIJJlOlIni,
determining whether the treatment in a particular case constituted "torture" depends on all
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the circumstances of the case. 25 The Court
stressed the fact that:
[T]he [European Convention on
Human Rights] is a living instmment
which must be interpreted in the light
of present-day conditions... and that
certain acts which were classified in
the past as 'inhuman and degradinat::>
treatment' as opposed to 'torture' could
be classified differently in the
future ....[T]he increasingly high standard being required in the area of the
protection of human rights and fundamental liberties correspondingly and
inevitably requires greater finnness in
assessing breaches of the fundamental
values of democratic societies. 26
~

In respect to persons deprived of their liberty, in Tomasi v. France (1992), the Court ruled
that "any use of physical force in respect of a
person deprived of his liberty which is not
made strictly necessary as a result of his own
conduct violates human dignity and must
therefore be regarded as a breach of the right
guaranteed under Article 3 of the Convention.
At the most the severity of the treatment is relevant in determining, where appropriate,
whether there has been torture." 27 The Court
however, has demonstrated in several j l1dg~
ments a reluctance to find prison conditions to
be in breach of Article 3, perhaps because of
the high burden that would be placed on very
poor countries. 2a
The prohibition of torture or inhuman treatment has become an important factor in evaluating the permissibility of deportations. The
Court ruled in Soering v. United Kingdom
(1989) that Article 3 prohibits the extradition
of a person who is threatened with torture or
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment in the requesting country. Extradition in
such circumstances would, according to the
Court, "plainly be contrary to the spirit and
intendment of the Article" and would "hardly

be compatible with the underlying values of
the Convention." 29 In two cases decided in
1991, the Court held that the same considerations apply to expulsion cases. 30
Important, Article 3 protects against torture
and ill-treatment irrespective of what a person
has done or has been accused of doing, even if
an individual is a suspected terrorist. In
Chahal v. the United Kingdom (I 996), for
example, the U.K. wished to deport Mr.
Chahal to India because his alleged tCITorist
activities posed a risk to the national security
of the U.K. The Court, however, confirmed
that, "Article 3 enshrines one 0 f the most fundamental values of democratic society....The
Court is well aware of the immense difficulties faced by States in protecting their communities from tcrrorist violence. Howcver,
even in these circumstances, the Convention
prohibits in absolute terms torture or inhuman
or degrading treatment or punishment, irrespective of the victim's conduct."31
The first time that the Court made a finding
of torture was in Aksoy v. Turkey (1996). In
that case, the COUlt found that, while held in
police custody, Mr. Aksoy was subjected to
what is known as "Palestinian hanging." The
Court expressed its view that this treatment
could only have been deliberately inflicted. It
would appear to have been administered with
the aim of obtaining admissions or information from the applicant. In addition to the
severe pain which it must have caused at the
time, the medical evidence shows that it led to
a paralysis of both arms which lasted for some
time. The Court considers that this treatment
was of such a serious and cruel nature that it
can only be described as torture.3~
Since then, the Court has ruled that treatment such as rape and sexual assault by the.
police of a detainee,33 and severe beating by
the police of a detainee,3-l amount to torture. In
Assenov v. Bulgaria, the Court concluded that
a violation of Article 3 had occurred, not for
ill-treatment per se but for a failure to carry
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out effective official investigation on the allegation of ill treatment. The Court recognized
that
circumstances, where an individual
raises an arguable claim that he has
been scriously ill treated by the police
or other such agcnts of the State,
unlawfully and in breach of Article 3,
that provi si on, read in conj unction
with Article I of the Convention "to
secure evelyone within their jurisdiction the rights and freedoms in the
Convention," requires by implication
that there should be an cffective official investigation. This obligation
should be capable of leading to the
identi fication and punishmcnt of those
rcsponsible. If this is not the case, the
general legal prohibition of torture and
lnhuman and degrading treatment and
punishment, despite its fundamental
importance, would bc ineffective in
practice and it would bc possible in
some cases for agents of the State to
abuse the rights of those within their
control with virtual impunity..15
The Statute of the International Criminal
Court.16 which has been ratified by 99 nations
(although not the United States) further establishes criminal jurisdiction over war crimes
and crimes against humanity. It defines
crimes against humanity to include torture
and other "inhumane acts of a similar character intentionally causing great suffering, or
serious injury to body or to mental or physical
health." The Statute also gives the ICC "war
crimes" jurisdiction over "[t]orture or inhuman treatment, including biological experiments; ... [and] Wilfully causing great suffering, or serious injury to body or health."
The prohibition against torture and other
ill-treatment has become so widely accepted
as a matter of legal obligation that many
courts now consider the prohibition to qualify
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not only as a matter of customary international law, but also an even more forceful principle of jus cogens, that is, a preemptory norm
of international law that would even trump
treaty obligations. For example, the wellrespected Restatement of the Foreign
Relations Law of the United States declares in
regard to the customary international law of
human rights that:
A state violates international law iC as a
matter of state policy, it practices, encourages,
or condones
(3) genocide,
(b) slavery or slave trade,
(c) the murder or causing the disappearance
of individuals,
(d) torture or other cruel, inhuman, or
degrading treatment or punishment,
(c) prolonged arbitrary detention,
(f) systematic racial discrimination, or
(g) a consistent pattern of gross violations
of internationally recognized human
rights.J7
Application of the Prohibition of Torture and Illtreatment to the United States

u.s. Reservations to Huma/l Rights Treaties
and their Validity
Given all these clear and unequivocal legal
principles prohibiting torture and ill-treatment, we need to review their application to
the United States. The United States is a party
to most of the relevant treaties, that is, the
U.N. Charter as elaborated by the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights, the Geneva
Conventions, the Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights, and the Convention against
TOl1ure. In ratifying two of those treaties, the
U.S. interposed reservations and an understanding that purported to limit their application to the U.S. For example, in ratifying the
Civil and Political Covenant, the U.S. submitted a reservation
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(3) That the United States considers
itself bound by Aliicle 7 to the extent
that "cruel, inhuman or degrading
treatment or punishment" means the
cruel and unusual treatment or punishment prohibited by the Fifth, Eighth
and/or Fourteenth Amendments to the
Constitution of the United States.3~
Similarly, in ratifying the Convention
Against Torture, the U.S. submitted a reservation
That the United States considers itself
bound by the obligation under Article
16 to prevent "cruel, inhuman or
degrading treatment or punishment,"
only insofar as the term "cmel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment" means the cruel, unusual and
inhumane treatment or punishment
prohibited by the Fifth, Eighth, and/or
Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the United States)')
The U.S. further submitted an understanding to the Convention Against Torture stating:
(a) That with reference to Article I, the
United States understands that, in
order to constitute torture, an act must
be specifically intended to inflict
severe physical or mental pain or suffering and that mental pain or suiTering refers to prolonged mental harm
caused by or resulting from: (1) the
intentional infliction or threatened
infliction of severe physical pain or
suffering; (2) the administration or
application, or threatened administration or application, of mind altering
substances or other procedures calculated to disrupt profoundly the senses
or the personality; (3) the threat of
imminent death; or (4) the threat that
another person will imminently be
subjected to death, severe physical
pain or suffering, or the administration

or application of mind altering substances or other procedures calculated
to disrupt profoundly the senses or
personality.
(b) That the United States understands
that the definition of torture in Article
I is intended to apply only to acts
directed against persons in the offender's custody or physical control.
In order to be valid, a reservation must be
consistent with the object and purpose of a
treaty. The Human Rights Committee and the
Committee against TOlture are the two institutions responsible for implementing the Civil
and Political Covenant and the Convention
against Torture, respectively. The Human
Rights Committee reviewed the first U.S.
report under the Civil and Political Covenant
in 1995 and declared:
The Committee regrets the extent of
the State pmiy's reservations, declarations and understandings to the
Covenant.. ..The Committee is also
particularly concerned at reservations
to... article 7 of the Covenant, which it
believes to be incompatible with the
object and purpose of the Covenant,40
Similarly, in reviewing the U.S. report
under the Convention against Torture, the
Committee against Torture expressed its concern about the "reservation lodged to article
16, in violation of the Convention, the effect
of which is to limit the application of the
Convcntion.... "41 The U.S. in its report to the
Committee against Torture sought to reassure
the Committee that the principal reason for
the reservation related to the term "degrading
treatment," which the U.S. found to be vague
and ambiguous. The U.S. also indicat~d that.
the federal Constitution and interpretations of
the Constitution "provide extensive protections against cruel and inhuman punishment,
and these protections reach much of the con-
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duct and practice to which article 16 is in fact
addressed. "42
It should be noted that despite the efforts of
the U.S. to limit the application of the prohibition of cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment, the United States failed
to interpose any reservation or understanding
to Article 10 of the Civil and Political
Covenant that provides: "All persons
deprived of their liberty shall be treated with
humanity and with respect for the inherent
dignity of the human person." As we consider the further conduct of the United States in
Afghanistan, Guantanamo, and Iraq, we
should keep that provision in mind.

Application of the Humanitarian Lmv
Prohibition of Torture and Ill- Treatment 10
the United States with regard to af Qaeda and
Taliban Detainees
President George W. Bush on February 7,
2002, declared with regard to the "Humane
Treatment of al Qaeda and Taliban detainees"
that:
Of course, our values as a Nation, values that we share with many nations
in the world, call for us to treat
detainees humanely, including those
who are not legally entitled to such
treatment. Our nation has been and
will continue to be a strong supporter
of Geneva and its principles. As a
matter of policy, the United States
Armed Forces shall continue to treat
detainees humanely and, to the extent
appropriate and consistent with military necessity, in a manner consistent
with the principles of Geneva....The
United States will hold states, organizations, and individuals who gain
control of United States personnel
responsible for treating such personnel humanely and consistent with
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applicable law:B
On the one hand, this statement appears to
commit the United States military to treating
detainees humanely and appears to be consistent with the traditional respect of the United
States for human rights. On the other hand, a
closer reading reflects a bold and treacherous
attack on the international legal prohibition of
torture and other ill-treatment. President Bush
says that al Qaeda and Taliban detainees are
"not legally entitled to" be treated humanely.
Further, they will be treated humanely consistent with the Geneva Conventions only "to
the ex tent appropriate and consistent with
military necessity." There is no qualification
in the Geneva Conventions for military
necessity with regard to the prohibition of torture or ill-treatment. There is no qualification
of any kind with regard to the prohibition of
torture and cruel, inhuman, or degrading
treatment in the Convention against Torture
or the Civil and Political Covenant, which
President Bush did not even mention.
What could have been the basis for
President Bush's disregard of U.S. international law obligations? In his February 7,
2002, declaration, President Bush indicated
his reliance upon the Dcpartment of Justice
opinion of January 22, 2002, that none of the
provisions of the Geneva Conventions apply
to al Qaeda.
As to international armed cont1icts, Article
2 of the Geneva Conventions indicate that
those treaties "apply to all cases of declared
war or of any other armed cont1ict \vhich may
arise bctween two or more of the High
Contracting Parties, even if the state of war is
not recognized by one of them." The Geneva
Conventions also "apply to all cases of partial
or total occupation." Hence, the Geneva
Conventions clearly apply to the armcd conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq, because
Afghanistan, Iraq, and the United States are
High Contracting Partics, that is, states that
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have ratified the treaties.-l-l
As to al Qaeda, however, President Bush
and the Justice Department opinion of January
22nd are correct in that the al Qaeda is not a
state and has certainly not ratified the Geneva
Conventions. But President Bush went on to
say:
I also accept the legal conclusion of
the Department of Justice and the recommendation of the Department of
Justice that common Article 3 of
Geneva docs not apply to either al
Qaeda or Taliban detainees, because,
among other reasons, the relevant conflicts are international in scope and
Common Article 3 applies only to
"armed con fl ict not of an international
character."
In making this finding, President Bush and
the Department of Justice ignored the authoritative commentary of the International
Committee of the Red Cross 45 in regard to
Common Article 3 and the overall approach of
the Geneva Conventions which is to cover all
armed conflicts whether international or
national. The ICRC Commentary states that
Article 3 represents "the minimum which
must be applied in the least determinate of
cont1icts." Common Article 3 was intended to
reflect the "few essential rules" that governments should follow in peacetime and in war
as wel1 as in dealing with common criminals
or rebels. The drafters of the Geneva
Conventions intended that Common Article 3
would protect those basic and fundamental
rights that deserve respect at all times. 46
In April 2005 the International Committee
of the Red Cross concluded a multi-year project in which it worked With the most distinguished international law experts from the
entire globe to study the law and practice of
all nations in the world with regard to humanitarian law, that is, the law of am1ed conflict.
The ICRC study foune! that customary inter-

national humanitarian law includes the following globally applicable rule:
Rule 90: Torture, cruel or inhuman
treatment and outrages on personal
dignity, in paIiicular humiliation and
degrading treatment, are prohibited.
In dra\ving this conclusion, the ICRC
referred to Article 75 of Additional Protocol r
to the Geneva Conventions.-l 7 Article 75 covers "persons who are in the power of a Party
to the conflict and who do not benefit from
more favourable treatment under the [Geneva]
Conventions." Accordingly, if there were a
gap between the international armed conthcts
covered by Article 2 of the Geneva
Conventions and the basic principles of
Article 3, Article 75 would supply a standard.
Article 75 states
The following acts are and shall
remain prohibited at any time and in
any place whatsoever, whether committed by civilian or by military
agents:
(a) Violence to the life, health, or
physical or mental well-being
of persons, in particular:
(i) Murder;
(ii) Torture (~f al kinds,

yvhether physical or
mental;
(iii) Corporal punishment;
and
(iv) Mutilation; [as well as]

(b) Outrages upon personal dignity, in particular humiliating
and degrading treatment, enforced prostitution and any
form of indecent assault; ....
The United States is not one of the 146
States Parties to the Additional Protocol 1for reasons that have nothing do to with
Article 75. But the Intemational Court of
Justice has found that Article 75 reflects "fun31
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damental general principles of intemational
humanitarian law" and a "minimum yardstick" for all armed conflicts.~8
Suppoli for the U.S. position can be found
in the contemporaneous memorandum of the
Secrctaly of State criticizing the Department
of Justice and White House advice that the
President Bush was receiving and on which
the President eventually relied.-l ? Secretmy of
State Colin Powell said:
I am concerned that the draft does not
squarely present to the President the
options that are available to him. Nor
does it identify the significant pros
and cons of each option.
Among the con arguments that Secretary
Powell identified were the following with
regard to the proposed view that the Geneva
Convention does not apply to the conDict:

It will reverse over a century of U.S.
policy and practice in supporting the
Geneva conventions and undermine
the protections of the law of war for
our troops, both in this specific conilict and in general.
It has a high cost in terms of negative
international reaction, with immediate
adverse consequences for our conduct
of foreign policy.
It will undermine public support
among critical allies, making military
cooperation more difficult to sustain.

Europeans and others will likely have
legal problems with extradition or
other fonns of cooperation in law
enforcement, including in bringing
terrorists to justice.
It may provoke some individual foreign prosecutors to investigate and
prosecute our officials and troops.

President Bush in his February 7, 2002,
statement had one further rationale for deny-
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ing the al Qaeda and Taliban detainees status
as prisoners of war under Article 4 of the
Geneva Conventions, which he stated as tallows:
Based on the facts supplied by the
Department of Defense and the recommcndation of the Department of
Justice, I determine thal the Taliban
detainees are unlawful combatants
and, therefore, do not q llal i fy as prisoners of war under Article 4 of
Geneva. I note that, because Geneva
does not apply to our conniet with al
Qaeda, al Qaeda detainees also do not
qualify as prisoners of war.
The Geneva Conventions identify four
major kinds of participants in international
anlled conllicts. First, there are combatants
who have the privilege of using violence
against each other. Second, there are prisoners of war who arc lormer combatants but are
detained and thus no longer in the connict.
They are given extensive protections under
the Third Geneva Convention, but they may
be questioned and may even be subjected to
criminal prosecution for war crimes. A war
crime, however, does not include attacking
the enemy during al111ed conllict. Third, there
are civilians who are protected under the
FOUlih Geneva Convention fi-cm1 attack, but
may be detained under administrative order
for periods of six months at a time. may be
questioned, and may be prosecuted for criminal offenses. Finally, in the Fourth Geneva
Convention, there is a brief mention of spies
and saboteurs, who arc subject to the protections afforded eivilians except that they may
also be deprived of only one relevant right,
that is, the right to communicntion with the
outside \\,orld,so
There is no category of "unlawful combatants" in the Geneva Conventions. and the
Geneva Conventions are intended to be comprehensive in their application-omitting
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protection for no one. If there is any doubt as
to \vhether a fomler combatant qualifies as a
prisoner of war, Article 5 of the Third Geneva
Convention indicates that there must be an
individual determination of whether he qualifies as a POW. Until that detennination is
made, the individual must be treated as a
POW. With regard to the question of whether
an individual may be subjected to torture or
ill-treatment, however, the issue of whether a
detainee qualifies as a POW is really irrelevant--a complete red herring. Under both the
Geneva Conventions and under customaty
international humanitarian law, the detainees
in Afghanistan, Guant,lnamo, and Iraq are
entitled at least to fundamental protections
against torture and ill-treatment.
Application of'the Human Rights Prohibition
oj' Torture and flI- Treatment to the United
States with regard to al Qaeda, Taliban, and
Iraqi Detainees
In his February 7, 2002 statement about the
treatment of al Qaeda and Taliban, President
Bush did not even mention the Civil and
Political Covenant or the Convention against
Torture. President Bush relied upon the
Department of Justice memorandum of
JanualY 22nd that also omitted reference to
human rights law. As we have already noted,
international human rights law, reflected in
the Civil and Political Covenant and the
Convention against Torture, forbids torture
and ill-treatment of anyone. That prohibition
applies not only in times of peace but even in
times of national emergency threatening the
life of the nation, such as a war or a terrorist
attack.
After President Bush made his statement
about the February 2002 treatment of al
Qaeda and Tali ban, politically-appointed
lawyers at the lustice Depaliment have sought
in a series of once secret, but now leaked
memos to justify their failure even to mention

human rights treaties. What arguments did
they make'?
In a memorandum of August 1, 2002, the
Office of Legal Council purported to analyze
the Standards of Conduct for Interrogation
under 18 U.S.c. §§ 2340-2340A. Sections
2340-2340A are two statutes that were adopt-

There is no category of "unlawful combatants" in the Geneva
Conventions, and the Geneva
Conventions are intended to be
comprehensive in their application-omitting protection for no
one.
ed by the United States to fulfill its treaty obligations under the Convention Against Torture
to subject torturers to criminal sanctions. The
approach of the Office of Legal Counsel
(OLC) was to give advice as to how U.s.
interrogators could avoid being subjected to
prosecution under the two statutes. Instead,
the OLC lawyers should have asked the question: How can the U.S. comply with its treaty
obligations to prevent torture and ill-treatment? If you were asked by the Minneapolis
Police to give advice on intelTogation of suspects, would you narrow the question to only:
How can you avoid being prosecuted for your
conduct? You would fulfill your function
more effectively by focusing on the need to
prohibit incommunicado detention, avoiding
exclusive reliance on confessions to prove
guilt, using video cameras in places where
detainees arc held or transported, training, and
other measures that would help prevent torture and ill-treatment.
The August 2002 OLe memo also focused
exclusively on an extremely narrow definition
of torture-omitting any discussion of cruel,
inhuman, or degrading treatment or punish-

33

THE LONG TERM VIEW

ment. You will recall that the U.S. interposed
an understanding and a reservation to the
Convention against Torture-the understanding narrowed the definition of torture and the
reservation narrowed the definition of "cruel,
inhuman or degrading treatment or punish-

alent to the pain accompanying serious physical injury, such as organ failure, impairment
of bodily function, or even death."
The OlC memo also narrows the kind of
intent required to say "pain must be the defendant's precise objective." It would not be

The OLe's extremely narrow definition of torture ... was withdrawn by
the Justice Department sometime during fall 2004 and was replaced in a
memo ... just prior to the confirmation hearings of Alberto Gonzalez who
had been the recipient of the August 2002 memo.

ment." Rather than maintaining the substance
of those two limitations, the August 2002
OlC memo attempted to narrow the prohibited torture and ill-treatment even further. For
example, the August 2002 memo defined torture as follows:
Physical pain amounting to torture
must be equivalent to the pain accompanying serious physical injury, such
as organ failure, impairment of bodily
function, or even death. For purely
mental pain or suffering to amollnt to
torture under Section 2340 it must
result in significant psychological
harm of significant duration, e.g., lasting tor months or even years. SI
The August 2002 OLe memo failed to cite
any authority in the Convention against
Torture, its jurisprudence, or any other international interpretations of torture to justify
that nan'owly brutal requirement for extreme
pain. You will recall that the Convention
against Torture requires only "severe pain or
suffering, whether physical or mental." The
August 2002 OlC definition of t011ure, however, narrows this definition in several \\'ays.
Most important, it requires far more pain or
suffering when it says "torture must be equiv34

enough that the perpetrator "acted knowing
that severe pain or suffering was reasonably
likely to result from his actions."s2 The U.S.
reservation on ratification narrowed that definition by requiring that "an act must be speci fically intended to innict severe physical or
mental pain or suffering." But the requirement
of a precise objective of inflicting severe pain
goes beyond that reservation and would conDict with the language of the Convention that
anticipates several motivations for torture,
that is, is "intentionally inflicted on a person
for such purposes as obtaining from him or a
third person information or a confession, punishing him for an act he or a third person has
committed or is suspected of having committed, or intimidating or coercing him or a third
person, or for any reason based on discrimination of any kind .... "
The OlC's extremely narrow definition of
torture-particularly as to the threshold of
pain required-\vas withdrawn by the Justice
Department sometime during fall 2004 and
was replaced in a memo of December 31,
2004-just prior to the confirmation hearings
of Alberto Gonzalez who had been the recipient of the August 2002 memo.
One aspect of the U.S. position. however.
has not changed, that is, the failure effectiv'ely
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to prohibit "emel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment" as required by the Civil
and Political Covenant and the Convention
against Torture. Intemational jurisprudence in
several cases has viewed torture as an extreme
form of cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment. Essentially, the difference has focused on the intent of the actor
whereby a perpetrator who intends to inflict
severe pain and suffering will be considered
to have committed torture. The distinction
may also deal with the severity of the pain
in tl icted. It should be recalled, however, that
both torture and cruel, inhuman, or degrading
treatment or punishment are forbidden.
The U.S. sought to narrow its obligation in
that respect by referring in its reservations to
the meaning of "the cruel and unusual treatment or punishment prohibited by the Fifth,
Eighth and/or Fom1eenth Amendments to the
Constitution of the United States." The U.S.
explained its reservation at the time by stating
that "cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment
or punishment" might be too vague to be
applied in the U.S. It is unclear to what extent
the content of the Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments have been interpreted in a
way significantly different from the content of
the treaty prohibition against "cruel, inhuman
or degrading treatment or punishment." My
initial research reflects several propositions:
First, the Fifth And Fourteenth Amendments
prohibit conduct that shocks the conscience of
the court. The leading case dealt with a suspect who had appeared to swallow drugs and
the police had pumped his stomach in order to
obtain proof of his drug possession. 53 The
Supreme Court found that conduct to be
shocking to their conscience, although the
Court latcr found that a required blood test to
prove alcohol consumption was not shocking. 54 One cannot be sure, however, that the
"shock the conscience" test provides much
greater precision that the cruel, inhuman, or
degrading treatment standard.

A second proposition is that the Eighth
Amendmenfs prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment applies only to sanctions
imposed after a trial. Since none of the al
Qaeda and Taliban detainees have been subjected to a trial, the Eighth Amendment would
not apply.
A third concern is that the Fifth, Eighth, and
Fourteenth Amendments may only apply to
conduct within the telTitory of the United
States or its jurisdiction. There are some
Supreme Court cases that have applied the
Constitution to court-martial proceedings at
U.S. military bases abroad. 55 The June 2004
Supreme Court decision in Ra.wl v. Bush 56
permitted detainees in Guanta-namo to file
habeas corpus petitions in U.S. courts, but that
decision was based on an interpretation of the
habeas statute rather than the Constitution.
The U.S. has taken the position that the
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights applies
only within the territory of the U.S., but the
Human Rights Committee has repeatedly
indicated that each State Party is responsible
for protecting the rights of all persons "within
the power or effective control of that State
Party, even if not situated within the telTitory
of the State Party."5? The Convention against
Torture and the Geneva Conventions are also
applicable to the conduct of governments
wherever they exercise their authority.
Whatever the content of the Fifth, Eighth,
and Fourteenth Amendments and the impact
of the U.S. reservations, the U.S. is still obligated by the Covenant 011 Civil and Political
Rights and the Convention against Torture
and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment to prevent not only
torture but also some kinds of ill-treatment.
Hence, it is particularly troubling to note that
the various OLC memos focus entirely'on an
extremely narrow definition of torture.
Similarly, when U.S. officials say that torture
is inconsistent with American values, it calls
into question all the methods of ill-treatment
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that U.S. military forces have been authorized
by the Secretary of Defense and other high
level officials to use. While one or two of
these forms of ill-treatment might not consti. tute torture by themselves, they reflect a climate of impunity. For example, a memo citing
the legal arguments from February and
August 2002 and signed by Secretary of
Defense Donald Rumsfeld on December 2,
2002 authorizes interrogation techniques for
detainees in Guantfmamo, including:
(1) identifYing the interrogator as coming
from a country with a reputation for
harsh treatment of detainees;
(2) the use of stress positions (like standing), for a maximum of four hours
(there is no indication, however, how
often that stress positions may be
repeated or how much time the detainee
would have between the use of techniques. 58 Also, Secretary Rumsfeld in
approving the document handwrote a
complaint: "However, I stand for 8-10
hours a day. Why is standing limited to
4 hours?");
(3) use of the isolation facility for up to 30
days with extensions to be approved by
the Commanding General;
(4) deprivation of light and auditOIy stimuli;
(5) hooding;
(6) use of20-hour interrogations;
(7) removal of all comfort items (including
religious items);
(8) removal of clothing;
(9) forced grooming (shaving of facial hair,
etc.);
(9) use of detainees' individual phobias
(such as fear of dogs) to induce stress;
(10) in some cases, use of scenarios
designed to convince the detainee that
death or severely painful consequences are imminent for him and/or
his family;
(11) exposure to cold weather or water;
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(12) lise of a wet towel and dripping water
to induce the misperception of suffocation, etc. In addition, the CIA was
reportedly given permission by the
Justice Department to use "watcrboarding," thc practice of forcing the
detainees head under watcr for prolonged periods of time. 59
These techniques can be used cumulatively
or all at once. If llsed together, and for long
periods of time, these techniques constitute
torture. Many of the detainees in Guantanamo
have been held for more than two or three
years. It is no wonder that there have been
dozens of attempted suicides among the detainees. Interviews and statements by released
detainees indicate that violent beatings have
periodically occurred against groups or individual detainees by military guards. Interviews with released detainees, reports of
human rights monitoring groups, and journalists' accounts reveal that many of the interrogation methods approved and implemented
first in Guantanamo were exported to detention facilities in Afghanistan and Iraq.
Rumsfeld's interrogation policy issued on
December 2, 2002 contained techniques that
were beyond those permitted by the Army's
Field Manual 34-52, which contains the interrogation guidelines in conformity with the
Geneva Conventions. The field manual established morc restrictive interrogation rules, for
example, prohibiting pain induced by chemicals or bondage; forcing an individual to
stand, sit, or kneel in abnormal positions for
prolonged periods of time; and food deprivation. Under psychological torture, the manual
prohibited mock executions, sleep deprivation, and chemically induced psychosis. 60
In December 2002 and January 2003, the
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)hl and
Judge Advocates 62 complained to the Defense
Department about aggressive interrogation
methods that 'vvere resulting in abuse and several deaths. In January 2003, Secretary of
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Defense Rumsfeld rescinded his blanket
approval of the techniques he had authorized
in December 2002. Instead, requests for using
the harshest interrogation methods were to be
fonvarded directly to him, along with a "thorough justification" and "a detailed plan for the
use of such techniques. "63
In addition, Rumsfeld established a
WOL"king Group to assess legal and policy
issues for detainee intenogation. The Working
Group's report was sent to Rumsfeld on April
4, 2003,64 recommending 35 interrogation
techniques, many of which seemed to minor
Rumsfeld's December 2002 guidelines,
including hooding, prolonged standing, sleep
deprivation, Cace slap/stomach slap, and
removal of clothing in order to create a feeling ofvulnerability.65 The Working Group reasoned that "[d]ue to the unique nature of the
war on terrorism ... it may be appropriate... to
authorize as a military necessity the interrogation of such unlawful combatants in a manner
beyond that which may be applied to a prisoner of war who is subject to the protections of
the Geneva Conventions." On April 16,2003,
Rumsfeld approved 24 of the tt(chniques recommended by the Working Group, including
dietary and environmental manipulation,
sleep adjustment, and isoJation. 66 Again, some
of these techniques were clearly inconsistent
with the Army Ficld Manual that had been
used since 1987.
In August 2003, Major General Geoffrey
Miller, who had been responsible for interrogations in Guantclnamo, was sent to Iraq to
"gitmo-ize" Iraqi detention facilities, or
according to a subsequent inquiry by Major
General Antonio M. Taguba, Miller's task was
"to review current Iraqi Theater ability to rapidly exploit internees for actionable intelligence." Miller reportedly suggested that
prison guards be used to "soften up" prisoners
for interrogations, and it is now known that he
was often present at Abu Ghraib. 67 In
September 2003, Lt. General Sanchez author-

ized 29 intenogation techniques (milToring
Rumsfeld's April 16 techniques) for use in
Iraq, including the use of dogs, stress positions, sensory deprivation, loud music, and
light control. 68
Since January 9, 2002-the day the
Department of Justice lawyers sent that first
memo to the Pentagon arguing that the
Geneva conventions do not apply to the war in
Afghanistan, or to members of al-Qaeda or
the Taliban-untiJ the present, numerous
accounts of detainee abuse and some deaths
have been reported. In May 2003, the
International Committee of the Red Cross
(JCRC) reported to U.S. Central Command
200 cases of alleged detainee abuse in U.S.
custody in Iraq, and continued to express concern confidentially about the abuse of the
detainees throughout 2003. 69 In December
2003, a secret U.S. Army report detailed abuses committed by a task force of Militmy
Operations and CIA officers, known as Task
Force 121 against detainees in Iraq) O On
January 13, 2004, Joseph Darby gave Army
criminal investigators a CD containing the
Abu Ghraib photographs depicting detainee
torture and abuses that had occurred from
September to December 2003. On February
24, 2004, the ICRC issued a confidential
report to the Coalition Provisional Authority
documenting widespread abuse in various
detention facilities in Iraq and command failures to take corrective action. The report was
eventually leaked, revealing that the IeRC
had observed abusive methods being used at
Camp Cropper in Iraq, including "hooding a
detainee in a bag, sometimes in conjunction
with beatings, thus increasing anxiety as to
when blows would come"; applying handcuffs so tight the skin would be broken; beating with rifles and pistols; issuing threats
against family members; and stripping
detainees naked for several days in solitary
confinement in a completely dark cell)!
During its Press Conference on May 7, 2004,
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a representative of the ICRC said that "what
appears in the report of February 2004 are
observations consistent with those made earlier on several occasions orally and in writing
throughout 2003. In that sense the rCRC has
repeatedly made its concerns known to the
Coalition Forces and requested corrective
measures prior to the submission of this particular report. lin
Two days after the rCRC report was transmitted, Maj. Gen. Taguba completed an informal investigation of the detention and internment operations in Iraq, reporting "systematic" and "sadistic, blatant and wanton criminal
abuses" at Abu Ghraib. 73 Examples of
detainee treatment from the Taguba report
include: "Breaking chemical lights and pouring the phosphoric liquid on detainees; pouring cold water on naked detainees; beating
detainees with a broom handle and a chair;
threatening male detainees with rape; allowing a military police guard to stitch the wound
of a detainee who was injured after being
slammed against the wall in his cell; sodomizing a detainee with a chemical light and perhaps a broom stick, and using military dogs to
frighten and intimidate detainees with threats
of attack, and in one instance actually biting a
detainee. "74 Further, Taguba reported that the
CIA kept some detainees in Abu Ghraib
prison off the official rosters. This practice of
allowing "ghost detainees" at the prison was,
in Taguba's words, "deceptive, contrary to
AmlY Doctrine, and in violation of international law." He concluded that the purpose of
this practice was to hide the prisoners from
the Red Cross. 75
Following the Taguba Report, which indicated that the abuses that occuned at Abu
Ghraib were not isolated events, the Pentagon
initiated a number of investigations, including
the "Schlesinger Panel," the Fay-Jones
Report, and the Church Report. Nearly all of
these repOlis, however, involved the military
investigating itself. In addition, all of the
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investigators placed the blame on lower-level
troops, claiming to find no evidence that senior U.S. otTicials played a direct role in ordering the abuses, even though secret memos
revealed that senior officials and several generals were responsible for giving instructions
that resulted in torture. 76 The investigators'
sharpest criticism, perhaps, ,vas that senior
officials had created conditions for the abuse
to occur. The "Schlesinger Panel," for example, stated that the abuse occurred due to confusion in the field as to what techniques were
authorized. 77 Further, the "Church Report"
concluded that there was "no single, overarching explanation" for the "few" cases in which
detainees had not been treated humanely, and
that "there is no 1ink between approved interrogation techniques and detainee abuse."7R
On March 3, 2005, pursuant to litigation by
the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU)
uncler the Freedom of Information Act, the
Army released more than 1,000 pages of criminal investigations. Among the bcts included
in the documents arc one undetermined manner of death, three justifiable homicides, one
alleged rape, one alleged larceny, and seven
alleged assaults or cruclty and maltreatment.
The allegations and circumstances in each of
these 13 cases were investigated and the cases
were closed; however, the investigations
failed to result in any criminal chargesJ" On
March 16, 2005, the Army reported to the
NeVI' York Times that 26 deaths of inmates in
Afghanistan and Iraq might be cases of homicide. so Although this statistic is certainly a
warning signal, it is not conclusive because of
the lack or information regarding the circumstances a f those deaths.

Conclusion
Although the U.S. government has claimed
that incidents of detainee abuse have been isolated to a few weeks at Abu Ghraib and
blamed the abuse on a handful of low-level
and poorly trained officers, the evidence inc.ii-

WEISSBRODT

cates that torture and ill-treatment in
Guantanamo and later in Afghanistan, Iraq,
and other military facilities were authorized
or at least condoned by high-level officials
beginning in 2002 and continuing even after
investigations of the abuses at Abu Ghraib. In
fact, the secret legal memoranda exchanged
by senior White House and Justice
Department lawyers since 2001 indicate a
deliberate and carefully constructed framework for circumventing international law
restraints on the treatment of detainees.
As fonner Secretary of State Colin Powell
observed with regard to the policies proposed
to President Bush in February 2002 and that
have resulted in torture and ill-treatment of
detainees, the usc of torture and ill-treatment
will undermine the protections of the law of
war for our troops, both in this spccific conflict and in general. It has a high cost in tcrms
of negative international reaction, with immediate adverse consequences for our conduct of
foreign policy. It will undermine public supp01i among critical allies, making military
cooperation more difficult to sustain.
Europeans and others will likely have legal
problems with extradition or other forms of
cooperation in law enforcement, including in
bringing terrorists to justice. It may provoke
some individual foreign prosecutors to investigate and prosecute our officials and troops.
The struggle to end torture and other cruel,
inhuman, or degrading treatment by the
United States is the single mostimpOliant
international human rights concern of our day.
lfthe United States continues its use of torture
and other serious forms of ill-treatment as
well as its practice of transferring detainees to
nations that are known to engage in such torture and ill-treatment, the U.S. will undennine
the credibility not only of the international
prohibitions against such grave abuses, but
threatens the credibility of all international
human rights treaties and institutions.
If the most powerful country in the world

resorts to torture and ill-treatment violating its
most solemn international commitments, how
can other nations be expected to comply with
fundamental human rights obligations? 8
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